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Secret Key Agreement under
Discussion Rate Constraints
Chung Chan, Manuj Mukherjee, Navin Kashyap and Qiaoqiao Zhou
Abstract—For the multiterminal secret key agreement prob-
lem, new single-letter lower bounds are obtained on the public
discussion rate required to achieve any given secret key rate
below the secrecy capacity. The results apply to general source
model without helpers or wiretapper’s side information but can
be strengthened for hypergraphical sources. In particular, for the
pairwise independent network, the results give rise to a complete
characterization of the maximum secret key rate achievable
under a constraint on the total discussion rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the multiterminal secret key agreement by
public discussion in [1] under the source model without
helpers or wiretapper’s side information. While the maximum
achievable secret key rate with unlimited public discussion,
called the secrecy capacity, was characterized in [1] using an
achieving scheme through the omniscience of the source, it
was pointed out [1] that the proposed scheme may not achieve
the minimum public discussion rate, referred to as the commu-
nication complexity. While a multi-letter characterization was
derived in [2] for the 2-user case, a computable single-letter
characterization is a challenging open problem.
Simpler versions of the problem have been considered,
such as the introduction of the vocality constraints in [3–
5]. Using the result of [3] with silent users and viewing
the secrecy capacity as the multivariate mutual information
measure (MMI) [6], these simpler problems can be resolved
completely [7]. Combining the idea of Wyner common infor-
mation and the MMI, a multi-letter lower bound on the com-
munication complexity was derived in [8]. For the pairwise
independent network (PIN) [9], the bound leads to a precise
single-letter condition in [8] under which the omniscience
strategy in [1] achieves the communication complexity. The
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Fig. 1: The graphical representation of the PIN (2.1). Each
edge corresponds to an independent random variable observed
by the incident nodes.
lower bound was further single-letterized and simplified to an
easily computable bound in [10], where the condition for the
optimality of omniscience was also generalized from PINs to
hypergraphical sources [11], using the idea of decremental
secret key agreement in [12] for the upper bound [13].
Unfortunately, the lower bound can be loose even for simple
PINs. It was also conjectured that the lower bound failed to
give the condition for the optimality of omniscience for general
sources.
By resolving the conjecture in [10], we discovered new
techniques that can improve the lower bound further. Although
the techniques are also based on the idea of MMI, they work
quite differently compared to the idea of Wyner common
information [8]. We apply these techniques to obtain an
outer bound on the region of achievable secret key rate and
discussion rate tuples. In particular, for PIN models on trees
our outer bound turns out to be an exact characterization.
In contrast with the rate region characterized in [14] for
two terminals using the idea of two-way interactive source
coding [15], the result is the first instance of an exact and
easily computable characterization for the case with at least
three terminals with unlimited number of rounds of interactive
discussion. We also use the outer bound to characterize the
communication complexity, and more generally, the maximum
secret key rate achievable under any given total discussion rate,
referred to as the rate-constrained secrecy capacity.
II. MOTIVATION
We first motivate the idea of secret key agreement and the
main results informally using a simple example. Let Xa, Xb
and Xc be uniformly random and independent bits, and define
Z1 := Xa
Z2 := (Xa,Xb,Xc)
Z3 := ( Xb,Xc).
(2.1)
Consider 3 users 1, 2 and 3 observing Z1, Z2 and Z3
respectively in private. The private source (Z1,Z2,Z3) is called
a PIN [9, 16] in the sense that its statistical dependency can be
described by a (multi-)graph as shown in Fig. 1 with the nodes
representing the users, Xa represented by an edge incident
on nodes 1 and 2, and Xb and Xc represented by two edges
incident on nodes 2 and 3.
If user 2 reveals F := Xa ⊕ Xb in public so that everyone
can observe it, then user 3 can recover Xa as F⊕Xb. K := Xa
is called a secret key bit generated by the public discussion
F because K is not only recoverable by all users but also
uniformly random and independent of the public discussion
F. A general asymptotic secret key agreement protocol by
interactive public discussion was formulated in [1], where
the maximum achievable key rate, called the secrecy capacity
and denoted by CS, was characterized by a single-letter linear
program. For the current example, it is easy to see that CS = 1,
since user 1 observes at most 1 bit in private and 1 bit of secret
key is achievable by the above discussion scheme.
A quantity of interest but not characterized in [1] is the
smallest public discussion rate required to achieve the secrecy
capacity, called the communication complexity and denoted
by RS. For the current example, RS ≤ 1 because the above
capacity-achieving discussion F is 1 bit. However, the precise
characterization of RS has been unknown even for the current
simple example.
In this work, we introduce new techniques that not only
implies RS = 1 for the current example but also characterizes
the maximum key rate under a total public discussion rate R ≥
0, called the rate-constrained secrecy capacity and denoted by
CS(R). For the current example, it will follow that
CS(R) = min{R, 1}. (2.2)
Although it is easy to see that CS(0) ≥ 0 and CS(R) = 1,
for R ≥ 1, and that CS(R) ≥ min{R, 1} by time sharing,
proving the reverse inequality is non-trivial and calls for new
techniques not covered by [8, 10]. Indeed, our techniques will
also imply that only user 2 needs to discuss in public, and so
a secret key rate of rK ∈ [0, 1] is achievable by a discussion
rate tuple (r1, r2, r3) iff they belong to the region
R = {(rK, (r1, r2, r3)) | rK ∈ [0, 1],
r1 ≥ 0, r2 ≥ rK, r3 ≥ 0}.
(2.3)
This matches our intuition, since users 1 and 3 have indepen-
dent private observations, i.e., Z1 is independent of Z3, and
so only user 2 can help them share a non-trivial secret key.
It turns out that the techniques apply to more general source
model with private randomization and interactive discussion
allowed as in [1]. It also completely characterizes CS(R) for
the PIN model.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the multiterminal secret key agreement [1]
without helpers or wiretapper’s side information. It involves
a finite set V := [m] := {1, 2, . . . ,m} of m ≥ 2 users. The
users have access to a private (discrete memoryless multiple)
source denoted by the random vector
ZV := (Zi|i ∈ V ) ∼ PZV taking values from
ZV :=
∏
i∈V
Zi, assumed to be finite.
N.b., capital letters in sans serif font are used for random
variables and the corresponding capital letters in the usual
math italic font denote the alphabet sets. PZV denotes the
joint distribution of Zi’s. The protocol can be divided into
the following phases:
Private observation: Each user i ∈ V observes an n-sequence
Z
n
i := (Zit|t ∈ [n]) = (Zi1,Zi2, . . . ,Zin)
i.i.d. generated from the source Zi for some block length n.
Private randomization: Each user i ∈ V generates a random
variable Ui independent of the private source, i.e.,
H(UV |ZV ) =
∑
i∈V
H(Ui). (3.1)
For convenience, we denote the entire private observation of
user i ∈ V as
Z˜i := (Ui,Z
n
i ). (3.2)
Public discussion: Using a public authenticated noiseless
channel, each user i ∈ V broadcasts a message in round t
Fit := fit(Z˜i, F˜it) where
F˜it := (F[i−1]t,F
t−1
V ),
(3.3a)
(3.3b)
t ∈ [ℓ] for some positive integer ℓ number of rounds, F[i−1]t
consists of the previous messages broadcast in the same round,
while Ft−1V denotes the messages broadcast in the previous
rounds. Without loss of generality, we assume this interactive
discussion is conducted in the ascending order of user indices.
We also write
Fi := Fi[ℓ] = (Fit|t ∈ [ℓ])
F := FV = (Fi|i ∈ V )
(3.3c)
(3.3d)
to denote the aggregate message from user i ∈ V and
the aggregation of the messages from all users respectively.
Key generation: A random variable K, called the secret key,
is required to satisfy the recoverability constraint that
lim
n→∞
Pr(∃i ∈ V,K 6= θi(Z˜i,F)) = 0, (3.4)
for some function θi, and the secrecy constraint that
lim
n→∞
1
n
[log|K| −H(K|F)] = 0, (3.5)
where K denotes the finite alphabet set of possible key values.
Definition 3.1 Given the private source ZV , a secret key rate
rK is achievable by the public discussion rate tuple rV :=
(ri|i ∈ V ) iff
rK ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log|K| and ri ≥ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|Fi|, (3.6)
in addition to (3.4) and (3.5). The set of achievable (rK, rV )
is denoted by R. The rate-constrained secrecy capacity is
defined for R ≥ 0 as
CS(R) := max{rK | (rK, rV ) ∈ R, r(V ) ≤ R}, (3.7)
where, for convenience, r(B) :=
∑
i∈B ri for B ⊆ V . ✷
Proposition 3.1 CS(R) is continuous, non-decreasing and
concave for R ≥ 0. ✷
PROOF Continuity is because the liminf and limsup in (3.6)
always exist, since CS(R) is bounded within [0, H(ZV )]. The
monotonicity is obvious, and concavity follows from the usual
time sharing argument. 
The unconstrained secrecy capacity defined and character-
ized in [1] is the special case
CS := lim
R→∞
CS(R)
= CS(RCO) = H(ZV )−RCO
(3.8)
where RCO is the smallest rate of communication for omni-
science, characterzied in [1] by the linear program
RCO = min{r(V ) | r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZV \B), ∀B ( V }. (3.9)
It was also mentioned in [1] that the unconstrained capacity
can be attained by a possibly smaller discussion rate, referred
to as the communication complexity
RS := min{r(V ) | (CS, rV ) ∈ R}
= min{R ≥ 0 | CS(R) = CS} ≤ RCO.
(3.10)
Our goal is to characterize or bound CS(R) and R using
only single-letter expressions. We will also specialize and
strengthen the results to the hypergraphical source model:
Definition 3.2 (Definition 2.4 of [11]) ZV is a hypergraphi-
cal source w.r.t. a hypergraph (V,E, ξ) with edge functions
ξ : E → 2V \ {∅} iff, for some independent (hyper)edge
variables Xe for e ∈ E with H(Xe) > 0,
Zi := (Xe | e ∈ E, i ∈ ξ(e)), for i ∈ V. (3.11)
The weight function c : 2V \ {∅} → R of a hypergraphical
source is defined as
c(B) := H(Xe | e ∈ E, ξ(e) = B) with support
supp(c) :=
{
B ∈ 2V \ {∅} | c(B) > 0
} (3.12a)(3.12b)
The PIN model [9] such as (2.1) is an example, where the
corresponding hypergraph is the graph in Fig. 1 with weight
c({1, 2}) = H(Xa) = 1, c({2, 3}) = H(Xb,Xc) = 2 and 0
otherwise.
Definition 3.3 ([9]) ZV is a PIN iff it is hypergraphical w.r.t.
a graph (V,E, ξ) with edge function ξ : E → V 2 \ {(i, i) |
i ∈ V } (i.e., no self loops). ✷
For this special source model, there is a protocol in [16,
Proof of Theorem 3.3] that achieves the unconstrained secrecy
capacity [16, (15),(17)].
Proposition 3.2 ([9, 16]) For a PIN with weight c, there is a
secret key agreement scheme, called the tree-packing protocol,
which achieves (rK, rV ) ∈ R with
rK :=
∑
j∈[k]
ηj and ri :=
∑
j∈[k]
(dTj (i)−1)ηj for i ∈ V , (3.13a)
where k is a non-negative integer; ηj ∈ R+ is a non-negative
real number; Tj := (V, Ej) is a spanning tree with edge set
Ej ⊆ V 2 \ {(i, i) | i ∈ V } satisfying∑
j∈[k]:B∈Ej
ηj ≤ c(B) ∀B ∈ 2
V \ {∅}, (3.13b)
which is the constraint for fractional tree-packing [17]; and
dTj (i) is the degree of node i in Tj . Furthermore, the un-
constrained secrecy capacity CS is the maximum rK over the
fractional tree packing {(ηj , Tj) | i ∈ [k]}. ✷
However, it was left as an open problem in [9] whether the
above scheme achieves RS. We resolve this in the affirmative
by providing a matching converse.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
We will make use of the following alternative character-
ization of the unconstrainted secrecy capacity in [11]: For
the no-helper case, CS = I(ZV ) where I(ZV ) is called the
multivariate mutual information (MMI) defined as
I(ZV ) := min
P∈Π′(V )
IP (ZV ), with
IP(ZV ) :=
1
|P| − 1
[∑
C∈P
H(ZC)−H(ZV )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=D(PZV ‖
∏
C∈P PZC )
] (4.1a)
(4.1b)
and Π′(V ) being the set of partitions of V into at least 2
non-empty disjoint subsets of V . The conditional versions
I(ZV |W′) and IP (ZV |W′) are defined in the same way but
with the entropy terms conditioned on W′ in addition. D(·‖·)
is the Kullback–Leibler divergence, which is non-negative, and
so are I and IP . It was pointed out in [6] that the set of optimal
solutions form a lattice w.r.t. the partial order P ′  P iff
∀C ∈ P , ∃C′ ∈ P ′ : C ⊆ C′.
Hence, there exists a unique finest optimal partition, denoted
by P∗(ZV ) and referred to as the fundamental partition.
Furthermore, both the MMI and the optimal partitions can
be computed in strongly polynomial time w.r.t. the number of
evaluation of the entropies.
In the bivariate case when V = {1, 2}, the MMI reduces to
Shannon’s mutual information
I(Z{1,2}) = I(Z1 ∧ Z2) = H(Z1) +H(Z2)−H(Z1,Z2),
because {{1}, {2}} is the unique partition in Π′({1, 2}) (and
is therefore the fundamental partition P∗(Z{1,2})).
We begin with some general lower bounds on the public
discussion rates:
Theorem 4.1 For any (rK, rV ) ∈ R, we have
r(V \B) ≥ (|P| − 1)[rK − IP (ZB)] (4.2)
for any B ⊆ V with size |B| > 1 and P ∈ Π′(B). ✷
PROOF See Appendix A. 
(4.2) is a lower bound on the total discussion rate r(V \B)
of the subset V \B of users required to achieve a secret key
rate of rK, for any choice of subset B of more than one user.
Choosing P to be the fundamental partition P∗(ZB) in (4.2),
IP (ZB) = I(ZB), which gives the following lower bound in
terms of the MMI.
Corollary 4.1 For any (rK, rV ) ∈ R, we have
r(V \B) ≥ (|P∗(ZB)| − 1)[rK − I(ZB)] (4.3)
for any B ⊆ V with size |B| > 1. ✷
Note that I(ZB) in (4.3) is the secrecy capacity when users in
V \B are removed. Hence, to achieve a secret key rate beyond
I(ZB), users in V \B must discuss. (4.3) states that the total
discussion rate of users in V \B is at least the additional secret
key rate rK−I(ZB) amplified by a factor of |P∗(ZB)|−1 ≥ 1.
Applying (4.2) to the example in Section II with B =
{1, 3},P = {{1}, {3}} (or simply (4.3)), we have
r2 ≥ (2− 1)[rK − I(Z1 ∧ Z3)] = rK (4.4)
This is achievable as mentioned in Section II by time sharing
between (rK, (r1, r2, r3)) = (0, (0, 0, 0)) and (1, (0, 1, 0)) ∈
R. Since CS = I(Z{1,2,3}) ≤ I(Z{1,2} ∧ Z3) = 1 and is
achievable, we have (2.3) as the achievable rate region R.
More generally,
Theorem 4.2 For PIN with weight c such that supp(c),
defined in (3.12), forms a spanning tree, we have
R = {(rK, rV ) | rK ∈ [0, CS],
ri ≥ (d(i)− 1) rK, i ∈ V }, where
CS = min {c({i, j}) | {i, j} ∈ supp(c)} ,
(4.5a)
(4.5b)
and d(i) is the degree of node i in the spanning tree. ✷
PROOF Since the source model forms a Markov tree w.r.t.
the spannnig tree given by supp(c), the unconstrained secrecy
capacity (4.5b) follows from [1, (36)].
To prove (4.5a), consider any PIN with weight function c
such that supp(c) forms a spanning tree. For any i ∈ V ,
choose B = V \ {i} and let P be the connected components
of the spanning tree after node i and its incident edges are
removed. It follows that P ∈ Π′(B) with
|P| = d(i) and IP (ZB) = 0
due to the fact that supp(c) forms a spanning tree. By (4.1)
in Theorem 4.2, we have
ri ≥ (|P| − 1) [rK − IP (ZB)]
= (d(i)− 1) rK.
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Fig. 2: The triangle PIN defined in (4.6).
The lower bound is achievable by Proposition 3.2, hence
completing the proof of (4.5a). 
The current example has a weight function c with
supp(c) = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}},
which is a spanning tree with node degrees given by
d(1) = d(3) = 1 and d(2) = 2,
which gives the lower bound (4.4) and hence the region
in (2.3). The capacity is the minimum edge weight, i.e.,
CS = min {c({1, 2}), c({2, 3})} = min{1, 2} = 1.
Unfortunately, the lower bound (4.2) can be loose for PIN
with cycles. E.g., consider a triangle PIN with V := [3] and
Z1 := (Xa, Xc)
Z2 := (Xa,Xb )
Z3 := ( Xb,Xc)
(4.6)
where Xa,Xb,Xc are independent uniformly random bits. This
a PIN with correlation represented by a triangle in Fig. 2. It
follows from (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) that
CS = RCO = 1.5 ≥ RS.
In particular, the secret key rate of 1 is achievable by the
scheme described in Section II.
Applying (4.2) with B = {1, 3} and P = {{1}, {3}} as
before,
r2 ≥ rK − I(Z1 ∧ Z3) = rK − 1.
This is the best possible bound involving r2 over all possible
choices of B and P , but it is trivial when rK ≤ 1. By
symmetry, the best bounds for r1 and r3 are also trivial when
rK ≤ 1.
Nevertheless, we discovered a different bounding technique
that can give a non-trivial bound in the above case, by exploit-
ing the hypergraphical dependency structure of the source:
Theorem 4.3 For hypergraphical source, we have (rK, rV ) ∈
R only if
α(P)r(V ) ≥ [1− α(P)] rK ∀P ∈ Π
′(V ), where
α(P) :=
maxe∈E |{C ∈ P | C ∩ ξ(e) 6= ∅}| − 1
|P| − 1
(4.7a)
(4.7b)
and ξ is the edge function of the hypergraph in (3.11). ✷
N.b., it is easy to see that α(P) ∈ [0, 1] because the maxi-
mization in the numerator of (4.7b) is the maximum number
of blocks in P that an edge e ∈ E can intersect, which is
between 1 and |P|. If α(P) = 0 for some P ∈ Π′(V ), then
(4.7a) becomes rK ≤ 0, i.e., CS = 0. This happens when no
edge crosses P , i.e., the source corresponds to a disconnected
hypergraph.
PROOF See Appendix B. 
For the current example, choose P = {{1}, {2}, {3}}. For
each edge e,
∣∣∣{C ∈ P|C∩ξ(e) 6= ∅}∣∣∣ simplifies to the number
of incident nodes, which is always 2 for graphs. Hence,
α(P) =
2− 1
3− 1
=
1
2
and so r(V ) ≥
1− 12
1
2
rK = rK.
Since CS = RCO = 1.5, the lower bound above is achievable
by time-sharing, which gives
CS(R) = min{R, 1.5} and so RS = 1.5.
Surprisingly, the argument can be extended to any PIN for a
complete characterization of the communication complexity as
well as the rate-constrained secrecy capacity.
Theorem 4.4 For PIN,
CS(R) = min
{
R
|V | − 2
, CS
}
, (4.8)
which gives RS = (|V | − 2)CS. ✷
PROOF The converse follows from (4.7a) with P = {{i}|i ∈
V }. More precisely, the minimization in the numerator of
α(P) is always equal to 2 as it is the number of incident
nodes of an edge. Hence,
α(P) =
1
|V | − 1
and so
r(V ) ≥ (|V | − 2)rK by (4.7a).
The lower bound can be shown to be achievable by Proposi-
tion 3.2. With (rK, rV ) defined in (3.13a),
r(V ) =
∑
i∈V
k∑
j=1
[dTj (i)− 1]ηj
=
k∑
j=1
ηj
∑
i∈V
[dTj (i)− 1] = (|V | − 2)rK,
where the last equality follows from the fact that∑
i∈V dTj (i) = |Ej | = |V | − 1 as Tj is a spanning tree. 
V. EXTENSIONS AND CHALLENGES
While the lower bound (4.2) can be loose in the presence
of cycles, it can be shown to be tight for hypergraphical
sources that correspond to hypergraphs that are minimally
connected in the sense that removing any edge disconnects the
hypergraphs. This generalizes the result of Theorem 4.2 from
PINs to hypergraphical sources. Both lower bounds (4.2) and
(4.7) can also be extended to include helpers. However, it is
unclear how one can generalize (4.7) to more general sources
that are possibly non-hypergraphical. Another interesting open
problem is to characterize R for PINs with cycles, thereby
improving Theorem 4.2 to allow for cycles.
The bound in (4.7) can be loose for hypergraphical sources.
A trivial example is where V := [3] and
Z1 := (Xa, Xc)
Z2 := (Xa,Xb,Xc)
Z3 := (Xb,Xc).
The numerator of α(P) in (4.7b) is 0 for any P , as the
mininum is achieved by the hyperedge c incident on all
the nodes. Hence, α(P) = 0 and so (4.7) becomes trivial.
However, with B = {1, 3} and P = {{1}, {3}}, (4.2) gives
r2 ≥ rK − 1, which is non-trivial for 1 < rK ≤ 2 = CS.
We also conjecture that (4.2) and (4.7) are both loose for the
example where V := [6] and
Z1 := (Xa, Xd)
Z2 := (Xa,Xb )
Z3 := (Xa,Xb, Xd)
Z4 := ( Xb,Xc,Xd)
Z5 := ( Xb,Xc )
Z6 := Xc.
We conjecture that (rK, rV ) ∈ R only if
r(V ) ≥ 1.5rK,
which is achievable using the idea of secret key agreement
by network coding [11]. It can be shown that the best lower
bound from (4.2) and (4.7) is r(V ) ≥ rK. Hence, we expect
that resolving the conjecture in the affirmative potentially leads
to new techniques for obtaining better lower bounds on the
public discussion rate required for secret key agreement.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
To prove Theorem 4.1, we will first prove the mult-letter
version of the bound in terms of IP :
Lemma A.1 For any B ⊆ V with size |B| > 1,
H(FV \B)−H(F|Z˜B) ≥ (|P|−1)
[
IP(Z˜B |F)− IP(Z˜B)
]
(A.1)
for any P ∈ Π′(B). ✷
PROOF Consider any B ⊆ V such that |B| > 1, and P ∈
Π′(B) as stated in the lemma. Define
at := IP (Z˜B|F
t
V )− IP(Z˜B |F
t−1
V ) for t ∈ [ℓ], (A.2)
where F0V := 0 deterministically for notational convenience.
Then, we have the telescoping sum
ℓ∑
t=1
at = IP (Z˜B|F)− IP (Z˜B),
and so it suffices to show that
(|P| − 1)
ℓ∑
t=1
at ≤ r.h.s. of (A.1). (A.3)
By the definition (4.1b) of IP ,
at =
∑
C∈P H(Z˜C |F
t
V )−H(Z˜B|F
t
V )
|P| − 1
−
∑
C∈P H(Z˜C |F
t−1
V )−H(Z˜B|F
t−1
V )
|P| − 1
(|P| − 1)at = I(Z˜B ∧ FV t|F
t−1
V )︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,
−
2,︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
C∈P
I(Z˜C ∧ FV t|F
t−1
V ),
(A.4)
where we have grouped the entropy terms in different brackets
into the mutual information terms in the last expression by the
definition of conditional mutual information. Using standard
techniques (cf. [18, Lemma B.1]),
2,
(a)
=
∑
C∈P
∑
i∈V
I(Z˜C ∧ Fit|F˜it)
(b)
≥
∑
C∈P
∑
i∈C
H(Fit|F˜it)
(c)
=
∑
i∈B
∑
C∈P:i∈C
H(Fit|F˜it)
(d)
=
∑
i∈B
H(Fit|F˜it)
(e)
≥
∑
i∈B
H(Fit|F
t−1
V ,F[i−1]∩B t,FV \B t)
(f)
=H(FBt|F
t−1
V ,FV \B t)
• where (a) follows from the chain rule and the defini-
tion (3.3b) of F˜it;
• (b) is because
I(Z˜C ∧ Fit|F˜it)
{
= H(Fit|F˜it) if i ∈ C by (3.3a),
≥ 0 otherwise;
• (c) is obtained by interchanging sums;
• (d) is because the summand on r.h.s. of (c) is constant
w.r.t. C, and so the inner summation gives a multiplicative
factor of 1.
• (e) is obtained by (3.3b) and an additional conditioning
on FV \B t, which does not increase the entropy.
• (f) follows from the chain rule.
Hence,
1,− 2,≤
[
H(FV t|F
t−1
V )−H(FV t|F
t−1
V , Z˜B)
]
−
[
H(FV t|F
t−1
V )−H(FV \B t|F
t−1
V )
]
= H(FV \B t|F
t−1
V )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤bt:=H(FV \B t|F
t−1
V \B
)
−H(FV t|F
t−1
V , Z˜B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ct
Since
∑ℓ
t=1 bt = H(FV \B) and
∑ℓ
t=1 ct = H(FV |Z˜B) by the
chain rule, the above inequality and (A.4) gives
(|P| − 1)
ℓ∑
t=1
at ≤ H(FV \B)−H(FV |Z˜B),
which establishes (A.3) as desired. 
We now single-letterize (A.1) to give the desired lower
bound (4.2) in Theorem 4.1:
PROOF (THEOREM 4.1) Consider any B ⊆ V with size
|B| > 1 and P ∈ Π′(B) as stated in the theorem. l.h.s. of (A.1)
in Lemma A.1 can be bounded by the total discussion rate as
follows:
H(FV \B)−H(FV |Z˜B) ≤ H(FV \B) ≤
∑
i∈V \B
log|Fi|
≤ n
[
r(V \B) + δ(1)n
]
(A.5)
for some δ(1)n → 0 as n→ ∅ by (3.6). Next, we simplify first
term on the r.h.s. of (A.1) as follows:
IP(Z˜B|F)
(a)
=
∑
C∈P H(Z˜C |F)−H(Z˜B|F)
|P| − 1
(b)
≥H(K|F) + IP (Z˜B|F,K)− nδ
(2)
n
(c)
≥n(rK − δ
(2)
n − δ
(3)
n ) (A.6)
• where (a) is by the definition 4.1b of IP ;
• (b) is obtained by applying the inequalities
H(Z˜C |F) + nδ
(2)
n
|P|−1
|P| ≥ H(K, Z˜C |F)
= H(K|F) +H(Z˜C |F,K)
for some δ(2)n → 0, by (3.4) and Fano’s inequality, and
H(Z˜B|F) ≤ H(K, Z˜B|F)
= H(K|F) +H(Z˜B|F,K),
and then grouping the entropy terms involving Z˜C to form
IP(Z˜B |F,K);
• (c) is because IP(Z˜B|F,K) ≥ 0 by the positivity of
divergence in (4.1b), and H(K|F) ≥ n[rK − δ(3)n ] for
some δ
(3)
n → 0 by (3.5).
Finally, the last term on the r.h.s. of (A.1) can be single-
letterized as follows:
IP(Z˜B)
(d)
=
∑
C∈P H(Z˜C)−H(Z˜B)
|P| − 1
(e)
=
∑
C∈P
∑
i∈C H(Ui)−
∑
i∈B H(Ui)
|P| − 1
+
∑
C∈P nH(ZC)− nH(ZB)
|P| − 1
(f)
=nIP(ZB) (A.7)
• where (d) is by the definition (4.1b) of IP ;
• (e) is obtained by the expansion
H(Z˜C) = H(UC ,Z
n
C) =
∑
i∈C
H(Ui) + nH(ZC)
H(Z˜B) = H(UB,Z
n
B) =
∑
i∈B
H(Ui) + nH(ZB)
by the definition (3.2) of Z˜V , the independence assump-
tion (3.1) and the fact that ZnV is i.i.d. generated from the
source ZV ;
• (f) is because the expression in the first pair of brackets
evaluates to 0 by exchanging the first two summation,
and the expression in the second pair brackets evaluate
to nIP(ZB).
Applying (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7) to (A.1) and dividing both
sides by n, we have the desired lower bound (4.2) in the limit
as n→∞. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
To prove Theorem 4.3, we will make use of Edmonds’
greedy algorithm in combinatorial optimization [17]. A set
function f : 2S → R with a finite ground set S is said to be
submodular iff for all B1, B2 ⊆ S,
f(B1) + f(B2) ≥ f(B1 ∩B2) + f(B1 ∪B2). (B.1)
f is said to be supermodular if −f is submodular. If f is
both submodular and supermodular, it is said to be modular.
f is said to be normalized if f(∅) = 0. The entropy function
B 7→ H(ZB) [19], for instance, is a well-known normalized
submodular function [20]. Edmonds’ greedy algorithm states
that:
Proposition B.1 ([17, Theorem 44.3]) For any normalized
submodular function f : 2S → R with a finite ground set
S, and any non-negative weight vector wS := (ws | s ∈ S) ∈
RS+, consider the linear program
min
µ
∑
B⊆S
µ(B)f(B) (B.2a)
such that µ : 2S → R+ is a non-negative set function
satisfying ∑
B⊆S : s∈S
µ(B) = ws, ∀s ∈ S. (B.2b)
Then, the optimal solution µ∗ to the above problem is given
as follows:
1) Enumerate S as {s1, ..., sk} (with k := |S|) such that
ws1 ≥ · · · ≥ wsk .
2) With Sj := {sj′ | 1 ≤ j′ ≤ j} for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, set
µ∗(Sj) := wsj − wsj+1 for 1 ≤ j < k
µ∗(Sk) := µ
∗(S) = wsk
(B.3a)
(B.3b)
and µ∗(B) = 0 otherwise, i.e., if B 6= Sj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
It follows that, if f is modular, the summation in (B.2a) is
constant for all feasible µ satisfying (B.2b).1 ✷
The algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 3a, which is a plot of ws
against s ∈ S. In particular, the horizontal axis enumerates
the elements S in a descending order of their weights w as
desired by the greedy algorithm in Step 1. The set of first j
elements form the set Sj , and the µ∗(Sj) is the drop in height
from the j-th bar to the (j+1)-th bar, with the exception that
µ∗(Sk) (or equivalently µ∗(S)) is the height of the last bar.
The proof is by a lamination procedure that can turn any
µ to µ∗ gradually without increasing the sum in (B.2a) or
violating (B.2b):
Lamination: For every B1, B2 ∈ supp(µ) such that B1 crosses
B2 in the sense that
{B1, B2} 6= {B1 ∩B2, B1 ∪B2},
reduce µ(B1) and µ(B2) by δ and increase µ(B1 ∩ B2) and
µ(B1 ∪B2) by δ, where
δ := min{µ(B1), µ(B2)} ≥ 0,
where the non-negativity is by the assumption that µ is non-
negative. Doing so reduces
∑
B⊆S µ(S)f(S) by
δ[f(B1) + f(B2)− f(B1 ∩B2)− f(B1 ∪B2)] ≥ 0,
where the non-negativity is by the submodularity (B.1) of f .
The procedure turns the support of µ to that of µ∗, namely
{Sj | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, which forms a laminar family (or more
specifically, a chain).
PROOF (THEOREM 4.3) For any P ∈ Π′(V ), by (3.4) and
Fano’s inequality,
nδn ≥
∑
C∈P
H(K|Z˜C ,F)
=
∑
C∈P
H(Z˜C ,F,K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,
−
∑
C∈P
H(Z˜C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2,
−
∑
C∈P
H(F|Z˜C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
3,
(B.4)
for some δn → 0 as n→∞, where the last equality is by the
chain rule expansion. We will bound 1,, 2, and 3, to obtained
the desired lower bound (4.7).
3, can be bounded by the usual technique (cf. [18,
1This is because −f is submodular and so the same µ∗ defined in (B.3)
both minimizes and maximizes the sum in (B.2a), the value of which must
therefore be a constant.
ws1
s1
wsj
sj
wsj+1
sj+1
wsk
sk
Sj := {sj′ | j
′ ≤ j}
Sk = S
µ∗(Sj) := wsj − wsj+1
µ∗(S) := wsk
s ∈ S
ws
(a) µ∗ in general (B.3).
w0 = |P|
s
1
=
0
we1
s
2
=
e
1
wej
s
j
+
1=
e
j
wej+1
s
j
+
2=
e
j
+
1
we|E|
s
|E
|+
1
=
e
|E
|
s
|E
|+
2
1
s
|E
|+
|V
|+
1
S1 = {0}
Sj+1 = {0} ∪ {ej′ | j
′ ≤ j}
S|E|+1 = {0} ∪ E
S|V |+|E|+1 = S
V
µ∗(S1) = |P| − we1
µ∗(Sj+1) = wej − wej+1
µ∗(S|E|+1) = we|E| − 1
µ∗(S) = 1
s ∈ S
ws
(b) µ∗ applied to the proof of (B.10).
Fig. 3: Illustration of Edmonds’ greedy algorithm in Lemma B.1.
Lemma B.1]):
3,
(a)
=
∑
C∈P
ℓ∑
t=1
∑
i∈V
H(Fit|F˜it, Z˜C)
(b)
≤
∑
C∈P
ℓ∑
t=1
∑
i∈V \C
H(Fit|F˜it)
(c)
=
ℓ∑
t=1
∑
i∈V
∑
C∈P : i6∈C
H(Fit|F˜it)
(d)
=(|P| − 1)
ℓ∑
t=1
∑
i∈V
H(Fit|F˜it)
(e)
=(|P| − 1)H(F) (B.5)
• where (a) follows from the chain rule expansion on
F (3.3);
• (b) is because
H(Fit|F˜it, Z˜C)
{
= 0 if i ∈ C by (3.3a),
≤ H(Fit|F˜it) otherwise;
• (c) is obtained by interchanging sums;
• (d) is because the summand on r.h.s. of (c) is constant
w.r.t. C, and so the inner summation gives a multiplicative
factor of |P| − 1.
• (e) follows again from the chain rule expansion on
F (3.3).
Next, we will bound 1, and 2, using Edmonds’ greedy
algorithm in Proposition B.1. For notational simplicity, define
Ei := {e | i ∈ ξ(e)} for i ∈ V
EC :=
⋃
i∈C
Ei for C ⊆ V,
which denote the collection of edges incident on node i ∈ V
and nodes in C ⊆ V respectively. Let S = {0}∪V ∪E, where
we assume 0 6∈ V ∪ E without loss of generality. Define YS
with
Y0 = (F,K)
Yi = Ui for i ∈ V
Ye = X
n
e for e ∈ E.
(B.6a)
(B.6b)
(B.6c)
Note that Z˜C = (UC ,ZnEC ) = (UC ,X
n
EC
), where the first
equality is by (3.2), and the second equality is by (3.11).
Hence, we can rewrite 1, as the sum
∑
B⊆S µ(B)f(B) in
(B.2a) with
f(B) := H(YB) for B ⊆ S.
µ(B) :=
{
1, B = {0} ∪ C ∪ EC , C ∈ P
0, otherwise.
Then, f is normalized and submodular as it is an entropy
function of YS [20], and (B.2b) holds with the non-negative
weights defined as
w0 :=
∑
B⊆S:0∈S
µ(B)
=
∑
C∈P
µ({0} ∪C ∪ EC) = |P|,
wi :=
∑
B⊆S:i∈S
µ(B) for i ∈ V
=
∑
C∈P:i∈C
µ({0} ∪ C ∪ EC) = 1
we :=
∑
B⊆S:e∈S
µ(B) for e ∈ E
=
∑
C∈P:e∈EC
µ({0} ∪ C ∪ EC)
= |{C ∈ P | C ∩ ξ(e) 6= ∅}|.
(B.7a)
(B.7b)
(B.7c)
As an example, for the triangle PIN Z{1,2,3} defined in
(4.6) and illustrated in Fig. 2, and the partition P :=
{{1}, {2}, {3}} into singletons,
w0 = |P| = 3
w1 = w2 = w3 = 1
wa = wb = wc = 2,
as we in (B.7c) reduces to the number of incident nodes of
edge e for singleton partition.
It follows that
w0 = |P| ≥ we ≥ 1 = wi ∀e ∈ E, i ∈ V.
Enumerate E as {e1, . . . , e|E|} such that
we1 ≥ we2 ≥ · · · ≥ we|E| . (B.8)
Then, the desired ordering in Step 1 of the greedy algorithm
in Proposition B.1 satisfies
s1 = {0}
{s2, . . . s|E|+1} = {e1, . . . , e|E|}
{s|E|+2, . . . s|E|+|V |+1} = V
(B.9a)
(B.9b)
(B.9c)
and so µ∗ defined in (B.3) can be evaluated as shown in
Fig. 3b, with possibly non-zero values at
S1 = {s1} = {0}
Sj+1 = {0} ∪ {ej′ | 1 ≤ j
′ ≤ j} for 1 ≤ j ≤ |E|
Sk = S = {0} ∪ E ∪ V.
By Proposition B.1, we can lower bound 1, with∑
B⊆S µ
∗(B)f(B) , which simplifies to
1,≥
µ∗(S1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(|P| − we1 )H(
YS1︷︸︸︷
F,K)
+
|E|−1∑
j=1
µ∗(Sj+1)︷ ︸︸ ︷(
wej − wej+1
)
H(
YSj+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
F,K,Xn{ej′ |1≤j′≤j})
+
µ∗(S|E|+1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(we|E| − 1)H(
YS|E|+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
F,K,XnE) +H(
YS︷ ︸︸ ︷
F,K,XnE ,UV ).
(B.10)
Using the triangle PIN and singleton partition again as an
example, we have
µ∗({0}) = µ∗({0, a, b, c}) = µ∗({0, a, b, c, 1, 2, 3}) = 1
the above inequality evaluates to
H(Z˜1,F,K) +H(Z˜2,F,K) +H(Z˜3,F,K)
≥ H(F,K) +H(X{a,b,c},F,K) +H(U{1,2,3},X{a,b,c},F,K).
We can follow a similar argument to bound 2,. Note that the
entropy in 2, is the same as that in 1, except it does not have
(F,K), and so we can eliminate Y0 from the above argument
to obtain
2,=
|E|−1∑
j=1
(
wej − wej+1
)
H(Xn{ej′ |1≤j′≤j})
+ (we|E| − 1)H(X
n
E) +H(X
n
E ,UV ),
which is identical to (B.10) except that (F,K) is removed from
every entropy term. We also have equality here because f is
modularover V ∪E due to the fact that Ys for s ∈ V ∪E de-
fined in (B.6b) and (B.6c) are mutually independent because
of (3.1) and the independence of the edge variables. It follows
that
1,− 2,≥ (|P| − we1 )H(F,K)
(f)
=(|P| − 1) [1− α(P)]H(F,K)
(g)
=(|P| − 1) [1− α(P)] [H(F) +H(K)− nδ′n]
for some δ′n → 0 as n→∞, where
• (f) is because by (B.8) and (B.7c),
we1 := max
e∈E
we = max
e∈E
|{C ∈ P | C ∩ ξ(e) 6= ∅}|
= (|P| − 1)α(P) + 1 by (4.7b).
|P| − we1 = (|P| − 1) [1− α(P)]
• (g) is by the secrecy constraint (3.5).
Applying the above inequality and (B.5) to (B.4) and simpli-
fying, we have
α(P)
H(F)
n
≥ [1− α(P)]
[
H(K)
n
− δ′n
]
−
δn
|P| − 1
,
which implies (4.7a) by (3.6) in the limit as n→∞. 
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